We use payroll data on 1.2 million bank employee years in the Austrian, German and Swiss banking sector to identify incentive pay in the critical banking segments of treasury/capital market management and investment banking for 66 banks. We document an economically significant correlation of incentive pay with both the level and volatility of bank trading income-particularly for the pre-crisis period 2003-2007 for which incentive pay was strongest. In a second step, we use the strength of incentive pay in unrelated bank divisions like retail banking to instrument the bonus share in the capital market divisions: A stronger 'pay incentive culture' increases both the level and volatility of bank trading income-generating an overall riskreturn trade-off unfavorable to shareholders during the pre-crisis period.
Introduction
In 2013 the European Parliament proposed new EU wide legislation on bank bonuses. Similar limitations were imposed in the U.S. in the post crisis years (e.g. Say-on-Pay rule included in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act). Large bonus payments for employees in the banks' financial market divisions were allegedly responsible for excessive risk taking. Limits on bonus payments were justified as a way to curb risk taking incentives (e.g. Dunning, 2010 ).
Yet there is only scarce empirical evidence about the nexus between the proportion of performance contingent pay and the amount of risk taking in financial institutions. One obstacle to such an analysis is the lack of information about the bank's internal incentive and bonus systems. Reporting requirements typically are limited only to the CEO and board members who might neither earn the highest bonuses nor make the most pertinent risk choices. This paper exploits a large payroll data set on 1. Second, we document the robust correlation of pay incentives with the bank's trading income and its volatility. On average, trading income in our sample amounts to 9% of the gross interest income of a bank and shows a systematic correlation with both the equally and hierarchy weighted strength of bonus payments in a bank. This positive correlation is particularly pronounced in the pre-crisis period and extends to the volatility of trading income. By averaging our pay incentive measure over a four year period we attempt to mitigate concerns for reverse causality whereby favorable trading profit realizations generate higher pay-outs of performance contingent contracts. Nevertheless, averaging the incentive pay by itself is unlikely to solve the endogeneity problem completely.
A third contribution consists in a causal analysis for which we propose two instruments: If banks vary exogenously in the degree to which they feature an 'incentive culture', we can use the bonus share in other bank segments like retail banking or corporate banking as proxies for pay incentives in the bank's capital market segment. To further validate this instrument, we show that the bonus share in these functionally unrelated bank segments shows no significant intertemporal correlation with yearly trading income, which suggest that bank bonus pools are indeed segment specific. A second instrument consists in the share of employment outside the capital market activity relative to total employment. A bank with a large retail and corporate banking segment might have a different board composition and monitoring quality of the relatively small capital market segments might be lower. Previous research has found weaker bank governance to be related to higher incentive pay (Fahlenbrach, 2009 ) and bank risk (Hau and Thum, 2009 ). Both instruments show a high positive cross-sectional correlation with the bonus share of a bank's capital market employees. The instrumental variable regressions generally produce larger coefficients for the role of incentive pay than the corresponding OLS regressions-suggesting that incentive pay causes both a higher level and a higher volatility of trading income.
The fourth step of our analysis consists in an analysis of the trade-off between trading income and its volatility. It is straightforward to show that if trading revenue is generated mostly through self-financing trading strategies without net capital requirements, the net present value (NPV) maximization of the risk-adjusted cash flow of trading is equivalent to the maximization of its Sharpe ratio. From the shareholder perspective the optimal incentive pay for a bank's trading desk should maximize this Sharpe ratio of trading income defined as the ratio of trading returns and their standard deviation. Generally, bonus based incentives have a much higher 'strike price' relative to the 'equity call option' embedded in the limited liability of equity ownership; hence employee risk taking incentives may largely exceed those of shareholders and imply excessive risk taking even from the shareholder perspective. Our regression analysis with respect to the Sharpe ratio suggests that high-powered incentive pay in the pre-crisis period was indeed associated with a lower Sharpe ratio of trading income, but no longer under the diminished pay incentives thereafter. The incentive pay moderation following political external pressure after 2008 may therefore have benefited shareholders. If pay moderation served bank shareholder interests, it should have served the public interest even more so assuming negative risk externalities under public bank guarantees.
A limitation of the analysis is that we cannot observe the exact type of speculative activity a bank is engaging in and compare risk taking across a specific trading activity. We cannot exclude that banks sort into heterogenous types of trading activity which might require different optimal incentive pay structures. Yet if such specialization across different capital market activities is underlying the observed correlation between trading income (and its volatility) and incentive pay, it is unclear why our instruments of 'incentive culture' in non-capital market segments should correlate strongly with such a specialization. While a more conditional analysis of bank risk taking is certainly desirable, better microeconomic data on the speculative activity within each bank is needed to undertake it. Unfortunately, the very limited public reporting requirements of banks do not allow such an analysis of individual bank asset positions.
The discussion of the literature in the next section and the tested hypotheses in Section 3 is followed by a description of the data in Section 4. Section 5 explores the structure of incentive pay at the employee level and the aggregate bank level. Section 6 first characterizes the correlation between pay incentives and the level and volatility of trading income; followed by instrumental variable regressions about the causal linkage, and an estimation of the marginal effect of incentive pay on the Sharpe ratio of trading income. Section 7 concludes. 1 Financial sector pay has become a particular focus of public discontent, because a substantial increase of compensation in the financial industry 1 The proposition to curb executive pay was rejected by two thirds of the voters.
Literature
can be observed in the run-up to the recent crisis (e.g. Phillipon and Reshef, 2012, for the U.S.
banking industry). Moreover, Bell and van Reenen (2010) document that about 60% of the increase in pre-crisis extreme wage inequalities in the U.K. is due to the financial sector.
The political debate is related to a broader academic dispute about the determinants of executive pay in general with two opposing views. A technological explanation in defense of high remuneration focuses on changes in the marginal productivity of corporate leadership in a competitive labor market for executives (Gabaix and Landier, 2006 The issue of optimal incentive pay becomes particularly relevant for banks due to their high leverage. Under bankruptcy costs or public guarantees for too-big-to-fail banks, even an incentive contract which is optimal from the shareholder perspective is likely to imply excessive risk taking from the public interest viewpoint 
Hypotheses
This study focuses on the incentives of non-executives in the two bank functions of Treasury/Capital Markets and Investment Banking. Considerable regulatory effort is exerted to isolate and limit the risk in these two functions from the ordinary deposit taking activity (e.g. Glode and Lowery, 2013). 3 Yet, to our knowledge, there exists no empirical examination of the relationship between non-executive incentives in capital market divisions and trading profits.
In a first step, we explore the existence of a positive relationship between high-powered in-centives and the level of bank trading income. High-powered incentives may be required in an environment in which work performance is highly dependent on effort levels. According to anecdotal evidence, work performance at trading desks is usually measured by trading profitability because it is contractable whereas trading risk is far more difficult to measure. Hence, if large bonus payments incentivize traders to make higher efforts to increase profitability, incentive pay will correlate positively with the level of trading income. However, the relationship between profitability-contingent incentive pay and trading profitability is necessarily marked by reverse causality. High and highly variable trading income will generally increase the measured bonus payments for almost any option-like incentive contract irrespective of its optimality. To exclude such reverse causality in part b) of Hypothesis 1, we make use of instruments which identify exogenous variation in incentive pay (see Section 6.3).
In a second step, we explore the existence of a positive relationship between high-powered incentives and the volatility of bank trading income. High-powered incentives may induce traders to increase profitability not (or not only) by higher effort levels but by taking more risky positions which are on average compensated by higher expected returns. However, the positive correlation between the volatility of trading income and bonus payments (Hypothesis 2 a) might also follow from optimal contracting between shareholders and traders: High-risk environments might necessitate higher pay incentives to ensure that employees stay vigilant and curbe the risk to the corporation. To exclude this alternative explanation as well as concerns for reverse causality (dicussed above), we use exogenous variation in pay incentives to establish a causal link between bonus payments and trading risk (Hypothsis 2 b).
In a third step, we evaluate the trade-off between trading income and its volatility and explore whether incentives are excessive in the sense that they tilt investment choices towards more risk and higher expected returns without value creation for shareholders. The shareholder interest consists in value maximization of the risk-adjusted present value of trading cash flows.
Let  denote the capital needed to finance the banks' trading infrastructure, which can generate (without leverage) a constant expected annual trading income (Π) with standard deviation of return on investment  Π = (Π) The net present value of the trading business follows as
where  0 and   denote the risk-free rate and the market premium, respectively;   represents the standard deviation of market returns and  characterizes the correlation between trading returns and market returns. Trading positions may consist largely of self-financing strategies which do not require much capital. They can also be scaled or leveraged, which will increase linearly the expected trading revenue and its standard deviation. It is straightforward to show that value maximization becomes equivalent to maximizing the Sharpe Ratio if expected trading income along with the standard deviation  Π can be scaled by a leverage factor  À 1 so that
where we define a constant term  =      0
Value maximization for the shareholder calls for pay incentives that maximize the Sharpe Ratio of trading income. Such value maximization might be best pursued by equity shares, which align employee interest with those of the shareholders. However, existing bonus incentives may feature a much larger convexity of payoffs than equity ownership and thus generate a conflict of interest between banker and shareholder. Provided that the Sharpe Ratio is a concave unimodal function of incentive pay, the optimal incentive contract is characterized by a zero marginal effect of incentive pay on the Sharpe Ratio. By contrast, a negative (positive) marginal effect of incentive pay on the Sharpe Ratio signifies excessive (insufficient) pay-incentives from the shareholders' point of view:
Hypothesis 3: Pay incentives and shareholder value maximization
Bonus incentives conflict with the shareholder interest if the marginal effect of a bonus increase on the Sharpe Ratio of trading income is negative.
We highlight that shareholder value maximization need not be welfare-optimal in the presence of public bail-out guarantees and a too-big-to-fail status of banks. 4 Inversely, in cases in which incentive pay is excessive from the shareholders' perspective, it is very likely to be also excessive from a welfare perspective. If the marginal effect of incentive pay on the Sharpe Ratio is negative, bonus moderation can be both in the shareholder and in the public interest. We examine the evidence for excessive incentive pay in more detail in Section 6.4.
Data

Compensation Data
This paper draws on a large payroll data set from the financial service sectors of Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The data was collected by a major international pay consulting firm from human resource departments of more than 120 banks in the three countries. The By contrast, employees eligible for bonus payments are retained and their bonus is assumed to be zero if bonus payment is recorded as missing. Third, we discard 4,708 extremely low compensation levels with a base salary below 24,000 Euros. Such positions correspond to lowpaid service functions like contact center employees and are excluded from our analysis. In order to discard data outliers which might be simple reporting errors, we also winsorize the ten smallest and largest observations for Age, Tenure, Base Salary, and Bonus. We also note that the standard deviation of the Bonus Share is highest at 20% in the segments Investment Banking and Treasury/Capital Markets.
Unlike in the U.S., granting stock options to middle and senior bank management is not generally practiced in Austria, Germany or Switzerland. However, some of the larger listed Swiss banks pay out part of their bonuses in bank shares at a discount. Such stock grants are not part of our Bonus statistics which counts only the short-term paid out cash component.
We assume that these additional incentives from equity ownership play only a limited role and can be ignored for the purpose of this study. Average trading income did not decrease in spite of the drastic reduction in the Bonus Share.
This suggest that the incentive pay moderation in Investment Banking and Treasury/Capital
Market segments occurred mostly under external political pressure. The following section discusses the trading income data in more detail.
Bank Trading Income and its Volatility
In this paper we focus on the Trading Income of a bank as function of a bank's incentive Table 3 provides the summary statistics on this bank sample. The relative trading income is available for a total of 365 bank years. The bank size ranges from approximately 400 million for the smallest bank to more than 1.5 trillion for the largest with an average size of 101 billion in bank assets. 6 Trading income can be expected to increase in the scale of the financial market activity of a bank. We use the Gross Interest Income as denominator for Trading Income. 7 In the absence of any own account trading, Trading Income in percent of Gross Interest Income should be zero. Trading Income is on average positive for the 365 bank year observations in our sample with a mean of 8.59 percent of Gross Interest Income. Relative Trading Income is also highly volatile with a standard deviation of 20.96. The ratio is highly positively skewed which suggests that a logarithmic transformation should offer better small sample properties in a linear model 6 Reported extreme asset values here are rounded to not disclose the identity of the banks in our sample. 7 The banks in our sample follow different accounting standards, which makes total bank assets a problematic denominator for comparison. The income orientated normalization based on gross interest income should be a better procedure for scaling Trading Income and is applied in other recent studies [Moshirian et al. (2011) ].
relating relative trading profits to pay incentives. We therefore define the dependent variable Log Relative Trading Income as the (natural) log of (Relative Trading Income + ) where the parameter  = 1824 is chosen to reduce the skewness of the relative income ratio to zero. Relative Trading Income + ) where a parameter  = 005 implies a logarithmic transformation to a zero skewness of the volatility measure.
Whereas a higher trading income is desirable from a shareholder perspective, its volatility is clearly undesirable if the corresponding return contains a systematic component. How much systematic risk is embodied in the banks trading income is difficult to measure because trading income for most banks is reported only at the annual frequency. We can nevertheless report a pooled estimate of 0404 (0530) for the correlation  between annual relative trading income returns and the German (European) benchmark index DAX (Eurostoxx50). Both point estimates are statistically significantly different from zero and support the assumption that trading income embodies a significant systematic risk component for which shareholders will demand a higher expected return.
Incentive Pay Structures
Incentive Pay at the Employee Level
Before aggregating employee level pay incentives, it is interesting to examine those incentives across bank segments and hierarchy levels. Columns (1) and (2) The regressions reported in columns (5) and (6) 14.2% to 11.1% within the reference group of employees in the capital market segment. We also note that the explanatory power of our observed variable drops from an R-squared of 44.2%
in the pre-crisis period to only 25.7% for the crisis period. This suggests that incentive pay differentiation not captured by our regressors increased considerably.
Incentive Pay at the Bank and Bank Segment Level
Most of the empirical literature on bank risk taking is based on compensation data from board members or CEOs because of the corresponding reporting requirements. Yet in practise, most of the material risk taking decisions are likely to be taken at a lower level of the bank hierarchy.
The data from compensation surveys used in this paper allow for a much broader measurement of incentive pay using base pay and bonus pay data from all bank hierarchy levels. Our objective is to aggregate the employee data to a sensible aggregate measure of risk taking incentives at the bank level.
The most straightforward approach consists in defining an Equally-Weighted Bonus Share and an Equally-Weighted Base Salary as A second measure of the bank level risk incentives may account for the fact that the influence on risk taking decisions may increase in the hierarchy level of an employee. If we are willing to assume that his/her relative influence on bank risk taking is proportional to the average hierarchy specific total salary, we can define hierarchy weights (  ) accordingly. For the aggregate weight sum
of all employee observation in the Investment Banking and Treasury/Capital Market segments of bank  in period  we can define the Hierarchy-Weighted Bonus Share and the HierarchyWeighted Base Salary as
respectively. This latter definitions put more weight on the Bonus Share of employees at higher levels of responsibility. The underlying assumption here is that marginal influence on risk choices corresponds to the total salary of the bank employee. In Table 6 , Panel B, the Equally-Weighted Bonus Share and Equally-Weighted Base Salary are replaced by the corresponding hierarchy-weighted measures. The coefficient for the precrisis period in columns (1) and (2) are again approximately twice as large as those for the full 9 A simple OLS estimation with year fixed effects reveals a significant correlation between the annual growth rates of and both the level and vola 10 In the pre-crisis period, the sample standard deviations of EW Bonus Share and of (Log) SD of Relative
Trading Income are 014 and 170, respectively. Hence: 12235 · 014170 = 1 sample in columns (3) and (4) . The statistical significance of the coefficient for the Bonus Share is very similar irrespective of whether we aggregate the employee bonus shares with equal or hierarchy weights.
Instrumental Variable Regression
Performance contingent incentive contracts for employees should generally imply that trading income influences the Bonus Share as well as its variability. By averaging the Bonus Share over multiple years for both the equally weighted and hierarchy weighted measure, we are able to greatly attenuate this reverse casualty, but it is unlikely to be eliminated. A better approach to establishing a causal effect from pay incentives to risk taking consists in an instrumental variable approach, where we seek variables  correlated with the Bonus Share, but exogenous to the annual variations in trading income.
A first instrument consists in the bonus share in other bank segments not related to bank A second instrument relates to bank structure and governance: If employment in the bank segments unrelated to trading and investment banking is large relative to the capital market segment, then corporate boards might focus more on the non-trading divisions and the capital market division might face less supervision from the executive board and fewer constraints on its bonus share (Fahlenbrach, 2009 ). We therefore define Employment Other Segments as the employment share of non-trading divisions relative to total bank employment.
The first-stage regression, which explains the EW Bonus Share as a function of these two instruments and the other control variables, is reported in Table 7 , Panel A. Reported are robust standard errors clustered at the bank level. Both instruments feature a high correlation with the EW Bonus Share in the pre-crisis period and in the extended sample period in columns (1)- (2) and (3)- (4) Share is instrumented by two variables simultaneously, we can also test the overidentification restriction. All specifications pass the test.
We can also use the instruments to repeat the regressions for trading income volatility.
Results for the corresponding IV regressions are reported in Table 8 . Panel A provides the first-stage regression, whereas Panel B and C report the IV estimates for the raw and filtered instruments, respectively. Again we have strong instruments as indicated by the F-test for the excluded instruments with F-statistics ranging from 1168 to 2829.
The IV estimate of 16871 for the EW Bonus Share coefficient in Table 8 , Panel B, column
(1), is again larger than the corresponding OLS estimate of 12235 in Table 6 (3) and (4) are smaller and statistically significant only at the 5% level. Yet, they are still larger than the corresponding OLS point estimates in Table 6 , Panel A, columns (3) and (4). We also note that the overidentification test cannot reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments in any specification. Overall, we find evidence that banks with a general "incentive culture" proxied by the Bonus Share in other (non-capital market) segments feature economically and statistically higher volatility in their trading income particularly in the pre-crisis period.
The Sharpe Ratio of Trading Income
The instrumental variable regressions in the previous section suggest that a higher Bonus Share increases both the level and volatility of Relative Trading Income. How can we evaluate the trade-off between higher income and higher risk? An incentive pay system should be optimal for bank shareholders if it maximizes the (risk-adjusted) present value of future trading income.
As argued in Section 3, shareholder value maximization under self-financing trading strategies amounts to maximizing the Sharpe Ratio of trading income. 
At the optimum and conditional on the control variables , the local average treatment effect (LATE) captured by the coefficient   should be zero-implying that neither an increase nor a decrease of the Bonus Share allows for a (locally) larger Sharpe Ratio.
We calculate the Sharpe ratio as the ratio of the average Relative Trading Income and This interpretation is supported by the fact that (at the bank level) Relative Trading Income did not significantly change during the crisis period. Table 9 reports in column (1) and (2) the first-stage OLS regressions for the two instrumented variables and in column (3) the second-stage results. The F-statistics for the null hypothesis that both first-stage OLS coefficient for the two instruments are zero are 565 and 320, respectively. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic is 448 and not particularly high.
But it exceeds the critical value 395 of the Stock-Yogo (2005) test that the instruments are strong for a maximal size of 20% (with approximately a 5% significance level). At this threshold size, we can therefore reject the weak instrument hypothesis.
In column (3), the IV coefficient of −214 for EW Bonus Share is negative, which implies that banks with a culture of large Bonus Shares obtain a lower Sharpe Ratio of Trading Income.
This is indicative of excessive incentive pay not in line with shareholder interests. But we note that the coefficient is estimated with a relative large error and is significant only at the 10% level. Given the low Kleibergen-Paap statistic, the coefficient is likely to be biased towards the OLS coefficient reported in column (4) , which is at −28 higher. This suggest that the IV coefficient is likely to be estimated with an upward bias.
The IV coefficient for EW Bonus Share × Crisis Dummy is positive at 295 and implies that the greatly reduced pay incentive system of the crisis period eliminated the negative slope of the Sharpe ratio with respect to incentive pay increases. Comparison with the OLS coefficient in column (4) of 53 suggests a downward bias for the IV coefficient. We also note that the Crisis Dummy is also positive at 71-suggesting a further increase in the Sharpe ratio during the crisis period. Reduced incentive pay during the crisis period appears to come closer to the first-order conditional for a maximal Sharpe ratio of trading income. Again, the weak statistical significance of the point estimates due to large standard errors implies that these results need to be interpreted with caution.
The results of Table 9 are graphically summarized in the residual plots drawn in Figure 5 . 
Conclusion
Empirical research on bank risk taking is often constrained by the lack of appropriate compensation data to measure the bankers' incentive pay. This paper draws on a large new data set on bank compensation in Austria, Germany and Switzerland and extracts the performance related bonus payments in the critical bank segments of investment banking and treasury/capital market management.
We contribute to a better understanding of bank pay incentives in four dimensions: First, We also fit the quadratic function from Table 4 , columns (1) and (2), to the observations of each period separately. Table 7 , Panel B, column (1) and Table 8 , Panel B, column (1), respectively. Table 9 . The slope of the blue (dashed) and red (full) line equal the correlation between instrumented bonus share and the unexplained component of the Sharpe ratio in the pre-crisis and crisis period respectively. (2) and (4) we weight each bank by the square root of the number of employee-observations used to compute the bank average bonus share (WOLS). All speci…cations include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** represent signi…cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. We use the same control variables as before: Log Assets = natural logarithm of bank assets; Net Loans/Assets = net loans over bank assets; and year …xed e¤ects. Two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions are used in columns (1) and (3). In columns (2) and (4) we weight each bank by the square root of the number of employee-observations used to compute the bank average bonus share (W2SLS). All speci…cations include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** represent signi…cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The last rows of Panel B and C report the p-values for the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The latter is purged of any interemporal correlation between trading income as the dependent variable and the EW Bonus Share Other Segm. We use the same control variables as before: Log Assets = natural logarithm of bank assets; Net Loans/Assets = net loans over bank assets; Crisis Dummy = 1 for years 2008 to 2011. Two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions are used in columns (1) and (3). In columns (2) and (4) we weight each bank by the square root of the number of employee-observations used to compute the bank average bonus share (W2SLS). All speci…cations include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**, and *** represent signi…cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The last rows of Panel B and C report the p-values for the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. 
